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Abstract
Working within the AGM approach, Peter Gärdenfors has proved that — given certain auxiliary assumptions —
there are no non-trivial belief revision systems that satisfy both the Ramsey test and the Preservation condition.
There are various ways of reacting to Gärdenfors' paradoxical result.  Gärdenfors himself has described his result
as a dilemma: we must give up either the Ramsey test or the Preservation condition.  Isaac Levi has pointed to an
implicit assumption in Gärdenfors' approach: conditionals express truth-value bearing propositions and are
therefore eligible as members of belief sets.  Here, we shall focus on another implicit assumption: a conditional
sentence A > B expresses one and the same proposition relative to every belief state.  We shall argue that
contrary to the this assumption, epistemic conditionals are naturally interpreted as context-sensitive: an epistemic
conditional expresses a proposition, but only relative to a belief state.
According to the approach advocated here, a sharp distinction is made between the semantic level containing
propositions and belief states and the linguistic level containing sentences and sets of sentences.  Belief revision
is viewed as an operation on belief states; and it is primarily propositions rather than sentences that are accepted
relative to belief states.  At the semantic level, Gärdenfors' result applies to the Ramsey test in the form:
(P-R) The proposition P ⇒ Q is accepted in the belief state S iff Q is accepted in the state S∗P which is the
result of revising S with the proposition P.
Thinking of the connective > as corresponding to a binary operation ⇒ on propositions is, however, tantamount
to assuming that epistemic conditionals are context-independent.  Once, we give up this assumption, we see that
the proper way of formulating the Ramsey test for propositions is not (P-R) but rather:
(P-Ramsey) P ⇒S Q is accepted in the belief state S iff Q is accepted in S∗P.
But, as we shall see, (P-Ramsey) is compatible with Gärdenfors' postulates for belief revision.  We also show
how to accommodate the full Ramsey test for conditional sentences, thus allowing for unlimited iteration of
conditionals.  Our conclusion is that there is no real conflict between Preservation and the Ramsey test — once
we take the context dependency of epistemic conditionals into account.
1.  Introduction
The Ramsey test gives the following intuitive criterion for the rational acceptance of (indica-
tive) conditionals:1
(RT) A conditional proposition "If A, then B" is (rationally) accepted in a given state of
belief S just in case B should be accepted if S were revised with A as a new piece of
information.
That is, in order to decide whether to accept a given conditional, I ask myself whether it
would be reasonable to accept the conclusion, if I learned that the antecedent was true.  If the
answer is yes, I now have good reasons to accept the conditional.  Otherwise, I should reject
it.
2To give an example of the application of the Ramsey test, consider the conditional:
(1) If the butler did not do it, then the gardener did.
According to the test, this conditional is acceptable, with respect to my present state of belief,
just in case it would be reasonable for me to believe that the gardener did it, after having re-
ceived the information that the butler didn't.2
Given a degree of regimentation, we may formulate the Ramsey test as follows:
(RT) The conditional "If A, then B" (in symbols, A > B) is accepted in a given belief state S
if and only if B is accepted in the belief state S∗A that is the result of revising S with the new
information A.
Or, more briefly:
(RT) A > B is accepted in S iff B is accepted in S∗A.
In this formulation of the test, we speak of (i) belief states, (ii) acceptance of a sentence A in
a belief state S, (iii) conditionals A > B, and (iv) the operation ∗ of revising a belief state S
with a sentence A (belief revision).  We do not, in this our official formulation of the test,
commit ourselves to any particular formal representation of belief states or any particular
formal representation of acceptance.
However, the Ramsey test has turned out to be problematic.  Peter Gärdenfors has shown that
the test — or at least a formal version of it — is incompatible with certain intuitively appeal-
ing postulates for belief revision. Gärdenfors presents this result, which we shall refer to as
Gärdenfors' paradox, in his recent book (1988).3   Gärdenfors' axioms for belief revision are
also presented in an already classical paper which he has written together with Carlos
Alchourrón and David Makinson.4
Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM, for short) represent belief states by certain sets
of sentences, so-called belief sets.  They also assume that belief sets are closed under the rules
of deductive logic.  On the AGM approach a belief state is nothing but a logically closed set
of sentences.  To say that a sentence A is accepted in a belief state S reduces to the claim that
A is a set-theoretic member of the corresponding belief set.  The AGM approach represents
belief revision as an operation on belief sets, that is, a function that transforms belief sets into
new belief sets, relative to new information.  If G is the original belief set and A is the new
information, then the new belief set is denoted by G∗A.  We refer to this new belief set as G
revised with A.  Note that the new information A may or may not be logically compatible
with G.  In the former case, the AGM approach takes G∗A simply to be the expansion of G
with A, i.e., the set of logical consequences of G ∪ {A}.  In the latter case, when A is
incompatible with G, G∗A must involve a genuine revision of G.  Some of the old beliefs
must then be given up in order to make room for the new information.
3In his discussion of the Ramsey test, Gärdenfors modifies the basic AGM approach by adding
a conditional connective > to the object language.  Thus, conditionals are treated just like any
other sentences of the object language as possible members of belief sets.  That a conditional
is accepted relative to a belief set is represented by the set-theoretic membership of the
conditional in the set in question.  Hence, within Gärdenfors' framework the Ramsey test
takes the form:
(GRT) A > B ∈ G iff B ∈ G∗A. (Gärdenfors' Ramsey Test)
Gärdenfors' paradox has both a formal and an informal dimension.  First, we have a technical
result — Gärdenfors' impossibility theorem — stating that the AGM approach cannot "on
pain of triviality" be augmented in the way described with conditionals satisfying (GRT).  To
be exact, Gärdenfors' theorem says that there is no AGM-system for belief revision satisfying
(GRT) together with the conditions:5
(Success) A ∈ G∗A;
(Consistency) if A ª/  L ⊥ and ⊥ ∉ G, then ⊥ ∉ G∗A;
(K*P) if ¬A ∉ G, then G ⊆ G∗A.
(Non-Triviality)  There exist two sentences B, C and three consistent belief sets G, H and K
such that:
(1) B ∈ G and G ∪ {¬C} is consistent;
(2) C ∈ H and H ∪ {¬B} is consistent;
(3) G ⊆ K and H ⊆ Κ.
Then, there is Gärdenfors' own interpretation of his formal result.  He focuses the attention on
the following Preservation Criterion for belief revision:
(P) If a sentence (or proposition) B is accepted in a given belief state S and A is consistent
with the beliefs in S, then B is still accepted in S∗A.
(K*P) is of course intended as a formal counterpart of (P) within the AGM approach.
Gärdenfors interprets the impossibility theorem as a dilemma: either the Ramsey test or the
Preservation Criterion has to be given up.  Here are some quotes from Gärdenfors (1988):
The main purpose of this section is to prove that, on pain of triviality, the Ramsey test and the preservation cri-
terion are inconsistent with each other. (p. 157)
The theorem and its corollary show that the Ramsey test and the preservation condition (K*P) ... cannot both be
rational criteria for belief revision. (p. 159)
Theorems 7.10 and 7.14 and their corollaries present us with a dilemma: When investigating belief revision sys-
tems, we must give up either the Ramsey test or the preservation condition. (p. 162)
Here, I shall argue that Gärdenfors result doesn't establish a genuine conflict between the
Ramsey test and the Preservation condition.  The appearance of a conflict is a result of the
particular way acceptance, belief states, and revision of belief states are represented formally
within Gärdenfors' approach.  I shall argue that this representation is based on certain ques-
tionable presuppositions.  Among these presuppositions are: (i) that all the propositions that
4may be accepted in a belief state are expressed by sentences of the object language (the ex-
pressibility assumption); (ii) that all sentences of the object language, including conditionals
express truth-value bearing propositions (the propositional assumption); (iii) that every sen-
tence of the object language expresses one and the same proposition in a context-independent
manner.  In particular, that the proposition that is expressed by a conditional sentence is inde-
pendent of the belief state of the person who considers the conditional in question (the non-
indexicality assumption).
In order to bring out the assumptions underlying Gärdenfors' claim, we distinguish between
propositions and sentences.  Primarily, it is propositions rather than sentences that are
accepted in belief states.  A sentence A is accepted in a belief state S just in case the proposi-
tion that A expresses relative to S is accepted in S.
A crucial step in Gärdenfors' proof of his impossibility theorem is the derivation of the
following monotonicity condition from (G-Ramsey):
(G-Monotonicity) If G ⊆ H, then G∗A ⊆ H∗A.
The informal condition that (G-Monotonicity) is intended to capture is presumably:
(Monotonicity) If S and T are belief states and all propositions that are accepted
in S are also accepted in T, then all propositions that are ac-
cepted in S∗P are also accepted in T∗P.
It is a trivial matter to derive (G-monotonicity) from (G-Ramsey).  However, to derive
Monotonicity from the Ramsey test is far from trivial.  Let us see how it is done.  Suppose
that all propositions that are accepted in S are accepted in T.  Let Q be a proposition that is
accepted in S∗P.  We want to show that Q is also accepted in T∗P.  By the expressibility as-
sumption, there are sentences A and B that express P and Q, respectively, relative to the state
S.  By the propositional assumption, there is a proposition R that is expressed by the sentence
(A > B) relative to S.  By the non-indexicality assumption, A, B and A > B express the same
propositions P, Q and R relative to all belief states.  Hence, we can write S∗P and T∗P as S∗A
and T∗B, respectively.  It also follows that B is accepted in S∗A.  Hence, by the Ramsey test,
A > B is accepted in S.  That is, R is accepted in S.  By the supposition, R is also accepted in
T.  This, in turn means that A > B is accepted in T (the non-indexicality assumption, again).
Hence, by the Ramsey test, B is accepted in T∗A, which means that Q is accepted in T∗P.
In proving Monotonicity from the Ramsey test, we needed all the three presuppositions that
are left implicit in Gärdenfors' approach.  Our conclusion is that Monotonicity is not in any
intuitive sense a logical consequence of the Ramsey test.
Isaac Levi (1988) has argued that Gärdenfors' dilemma is really a tri-lemma.  Levi points to
an implicit assumption in Gärdenfors' approach to the Ramsey test: that conditionals express
truth-value bearing propositions and therefore are eligible as members of belief sets (the
propositional assumption).  Contrary to this assumption, Levi maintains that conditionals lack
truth values.  For this reason, he also denies that they can be members of belief sets.
5Here, we shall focus our attention on another assumption that is implicit in Gärdenfors'
treatment of conditionals:
A conditional sentence A > B expresses one and the same proposition relative to every belief
state. (The Non-Indexicality Assumption)
We shall argue that — once this assumption is given up — there is no genuine conflict be-
tween the Ramsey test and the Preservation condition.  That is, it is possible without threat of
paradox to keep both the original Ramsey test:
(RT) A > B is accepted in a belief state X iff B is accepted in X∗A
and the Preservation condition in the form:
(P) If A is consistent with X, then X is included in X∗A,
without giving up the assumption that conditionals express truth-value bearing propositions.
When in (P) we say that one belief state X is included in another state Y, we mean that all
propositions that are accepted in X are also accepted in Y.  This does not necessarily mean,
however, that all the sentences that are accepted in X are accepted in Y.  In the presence of
context-dependent sentences, that may express different propositions relative to different be-
lief states, inclusion between the propositions accepted does not imply the corresponding in-
clusion between sentences.  Hence, the above form of Preservation does not imply:
If A is consistent with X, then every sentence that is accepted in X is also accepted in
X∗A.
The latter condition is plausible only if all the sentences of the object language are context in-
dependent.
2.  The context-sensitive nature of epistemic conditionals
The assumption that the sentences of the object language express determinate propositions in
a context independent way is implicit in the AGM approach.  If one and the same sentence
could express different propositions relative to different belief states, then set-theoretic state-
ments concerning belief sets, for instance G ⊆ Η or (A ∈ G & A ∈ Η), would not have their
intended interpretation.  Suppose namely that G and H are belief sets representing the belief
states X and Y, respectively.  Then, the following condition is supposed to obtain:
(∗) G is included in H if, and only if, X is included in Y.
If, however, the object language contains context-sensitive sentences, this connection might
fail.  To see that the right-to-left direction might fail, suppose that every proposition that is
accepted in X is also accepted in Y.  Let A be a sentence in G and let œA“X be the proposi-
tion that A expresses relative to X.  Since G represents the state X, œA“X is accepted in X.
6Then, by the supposition, œA“X is also accepted in Y.  But, from this we cannot infer that A
∈ Η.  For that we would need œA“Y to be accepted in Y which may not be the case, since
œA“X and œA“Y may be different propositions.  Hence, we cannot conclude that G ⊆ H.
To see that also the left-to-right direction of (∗) might fail, suppose that G ⊆ H and that the
proposition P is accepted in X.  G represents X, so there must be a sentence A ∈ G such that
œA“X = P.  Since G ⊆ H, A ∈ Η.  It follows that œA“Y is accepted in Y.  We cannot, how-
ever, conclude that P is accepted in Y, since œA“Y may be different from P.  Once we allow
sentences that may express different propositions with respect to different belief states, then
both directions of (∗) fail.  For context-dependent sentences A, even Success fails: A may not
be a member of G∗A.
What reasons could we possibly have for saying that conditionals are context-sensitive: that
they express different propositions with respect to different belief states?6  Consider the
principle:
(M) If the conditional A > B is accepted in the belief state X and X is included in Y, then A
> B is also accepted in Y.
If we assume that a conditional A > B expresses a proposition œA > B“, quite independently
of context, then the principle (M) seems to be valid.  To say that A > B is accepted in X then
means that the proposition œA > B“ expressed by A > B is a member of X.  But if X is in-
cluded in Y, then, of course, it follows that œA > B“ is accepted in Y.  So, A > B is accepted
in Y.
However, the principle (M) does not seem to be intuitively correct for epistemic conditionals.
Suppose that, in my present belief state, I accept the conditional:
if there is a storm tomorrow, the old oak tree will still stand.
Then, I learn that the old oak tree is infested with termites.  We suppose that this information
is consistent with my old beliefs and that my belief change is preservative in the sense that I
do not give up any of my old factual beliefs when I receive the new information.  However, it
is still quite likely that I should give up the conditional upon receiving this information.
Thus, learning a new fact might lead me to give up one of the conditionals that I previously
accepted, even if I do not give up any of my old factual beliefs.
If we assume that epistemic conditionals express propositions, then the natural conclusion to
draw from the apparent failure of (M) is that such conditionals express different propositions
with respect to different belief states.  Instead of assigning propositions to conditional
sentences in a context-independent way, we need to relativize the assignment of propositions
to belief states.  Only relative to a belief state does an epistemic conditional A > B express a
determinate proposition.  We should speak of the proposition œA > B“X expressed by the
conditional A > B relative to the belief state X.  It is then natural to say that the conditional
7A > B is accepted in the belief state X if, and only if, the proposition œA > B“X expressed by
A > B relative to X is a member of X.  In other words,
A > B is accepted in X iff œA > B“X is accepted in X.
Now, we see how the principle (M) might fail.  Suppose that A > B is accepted in the belief
state X and that X is included in Y.  Then, œA > B“X is accepted in X, so œA > B“X is also
accepted in Y.  But in order to infer that A > B is accepted in Y, we need instead: œA > B“Y
is accepted in Y.  This does not follow, since œA > B“X and œA > B“Y may be different
propositions.
The idea that conditional sentences express different propositions relative to different belief
states is quite a natural one.  Consider the following two sentences:7
(1) If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Verdi was French.
(2) If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet was Italian.
(1) could be used to make a true statement by a contemporary speaker who knows that Bizet
was French, but does not know the nationality of Verdi.  For such a speaker, the claim made
by (2) would be false.  The situation is the opposite for a speaker who knows that Verdi was
Italian but does not know the nationality of Bizet.
Now, what does A > B mean?  The analysis of conditionals given here is close to those of
Stalnaker and Lewis, except for containing an additional parameter: a belief state.  The intu-
itive idea is expressed by Stalnaker as follows:8
A conditional statement, if A, then B, is an assertion that the consequent is true, not necessarily in the world as it
is, but in the world as it would be if the antecedent were true.
In possible worlds terms we can express this idea roughly as:
A conditional sentence A > B is true at a world w just in case B is true at all the A-
worlds that are most similar to w.
However, here we shall think of the notion of similarity involved in the truth condition for
conditionals as an epistemic notion which is determined by the agent's belief state.  Making
this dependence on a belief state explicit, we get:
A conditional sentence A > B is true at a world w relative to a belief state X just in
case B is true at all the A-worlds that are most X-similar to w,
where X-similarity is a concept of similarity between possible worlds that is determined by
the belief state X.  According to this type of semantics, the truth-value of a conditional A > B
is dependent both on the state w of the world and the belief state X.  Relative to a belief state
X, A > B can be said to express the proposition:
œA > B“X = {w: A > B is true at w relative to X}.
83.  Gärdenfors paradox and its resolution
The approach described here differs from AGM and that of Levi (1988) in making a sharp
distinction between the semantic level involving propositions and belief states and the linguis-
tic level involving sentences and sets of sentences.  Belief revision is seen as an operation on
belief states; and it is primarily propositions rather than sentences that are accepted relative to
belief states.  We may think of  a person's belief state as the set of all propositions that he ac-
cepts.  We do not suppose in general that belief states are logically closed.
It is convenient for our purposes to identify propositions with certain sets of possible worlds.
If W is the set of possible worlds, then the set P of all the propositions that the agent might
entertain is a family of subsets of W.  A proposition P ∈ P is true at a possible world w if,
and only if, w ∈ P.  We suppose that P is a Boolean set algebra, i.e., it contains W and is
closed under the Boolean set-operations ∩, ∪ and -.  Belief states are certain sets of proposi-
tions, i.e., we have a family K ⊆ ℘(P) of all possible belief states.  A proposition P is ac-
cepted in a belief state X if, and only if, P ∈ X.  A belief state X entails a proposition P iff
∩X ⊆ P.
Once we are reminded of the context dependent nature of conditionals and other epistemic
constructions, the representation of belief states by sets of sentences and acceptance by set-
theoretic membership in such sets becomes less appealing.  If we distinguish between propo-
sitions, belief states, acceptance, on the one hand, and sentences, belief sets and membership,
on the other, we see that the most perspicuous way of formulating the conditions of Success,
Consistency and Preservation is in terms of the former notions:
(P-Success) The proposition P is accepted in X∗P.
(P-Consistency) If P and X are consistent, when considered separately, then X∗P
is also consistent.
(P-Preservation) If Q is accepted in a given belief state X and P is consistent with
X, then Q is still accepted in X∗P.
Now, if we formulated the Ramsey test in an analogous fashion as:
(P-R) P ⇒ Q is accepted in X iff Q is accepted in X∗P,
where ⇒ is a binary operation on propositions corresponding to the conditional connective >,
we would indeed be confronted with Gärdenfors' theorem.  We could then derive the follow-
ing monotonicity condition:
(P-Monotonicity) If X ⊆ Y, then X∗P ⊆ Y∗P.
And P-Monotonicity is easily seen to be incompatible with the above conditions on belief re-
vision, given the additional requirement:
(Non-Triviality) There exist two propositions P, Q and three consistent belief states X, Y and
Z such that:
9(1) P ∈ X and X ∪ {-Q} is consistent;
(2) Q ∈ Y and Y ∪ {-P} is consistent;
(3) X ⊆ Z and Y ⊆ Ζ.
That  is, we have:
THEOREM 1 (Gärdenfors impossibility theorem):
Suppose that S = <W, P, K, ∗> is a belief revision system that satisfies the above postulates.
Then, there is no operation ⇒: P × P → P satisfying the following version of the Ramsey test:
(PR) (P ⇒ Q) ∈ X iff Q ∈ X∗P.
Proof:  Suppose to the contrary that  there is an operation ⇒ in S satisfying (PR).  Using the
latter condition, we prove:
(P-Monotonicity) If X ⊆ Y, then X∗P ⊆ Y∗P.
By the non-triviality of S, there are propositions P and Q and consistent belief states X, Y, Z
satisfying conditions (1) - (3) above.  Let R be the proposition -P ∪ -Q.
It follows from (1) and (2) that X ∪ {R} and Y ∪ {R} are consistent.  Hence, by Preserva-
tion, X ⊆ X∗R and Y ⊆ Y∗R.  But, P ∈ X and Q ∈ Y, so P ∈ X∗R and Q ∈ Y∗R.
Since X ⊆ Z and Y ⊆ Z, Monotonicity insures that X∗R, Y∗R ⊆ Z∗R.  It follows that P, Q
∈ Z∗R.  Success yields that also R ∈ Z∗R.  But {P, Q, R} is inconsistent, so Z∗R must be in-
consistent.  On the other hand, each of Z and R is consistent, so the condition of Consistency
implies that also Z∗R is consistent.  We have thus reached a contradiction.  º
In the above theorem, we showed that the conditions of Success, Consistency, Preservation
and Non-Triviality are inconsistent with the existence of a binary operation on propositions
that satisfies the Ramsey test.
However, thinking of the conditional connective > as corresponding to a binary operation
⇒ on propositions is tantamount to assuming that conditional sentences are context-indepen-
dent.  Given such an operation ⇒, we could formulate the following semantic clause for
conditionals:
(i) œA > B“ = œA“ ⇒ œB“,
where œA > B“ is the proposition expressed by A > B.  But if we instead think of condition-
als A > B as expressing propositions only relative to belief states, we would rather like to
have something like the following semantic clause:
(ii) œA > B“X = œA“X ⇒X œB“X,
where œA > B“X is the proposition expressed by A > B relative to the belief state X and ⇒X
is a ternary proposition-forming operator taking two propositions and a belief state as argu-
10
ments.  We may think of ⇒X as a context-dependent propositional operator.  For such an op-
erator, the Ramsey test takes the form:
(P-Ramsey) (P ⇒X Q) ∈ X iff Q ∈ X∗P.
With P-Ramsey our proof of Gärdenfors' theorem does not go through, since Monotonicity is
no longer derivable.  To see this suppose that X ⊆  Y and Q  ∈ X∗P.  Then, by P-Ramsey, (P
⇒X Q) ∈ X, from which we conclude (P ⇒X Q) ∈ Y.  However, from this we cannot reach
the desired conclusion Q ∈ Y∗P.  To get there we would need (P ⇒Y Q) ∈ Y, instead.
As a matter of fact, we can prove that there are non-trivial belief revision systems of the type
<W, P, K, ∗, ⇒X> that satisfy the propositional versions of the Gärdenfors axioms for belief
revision together with the condition P-Ramsey.  That is, we have:
THEOREM 2.  There are systems S = <W, P, K, ∗, ⇒X> satisfying Success, Consistency,
Preservation, Non-Triviality, P-Ramsey together with the conditions:
(Closure) If X entails P, then P ∈ X;
(W) X∗W = X;
(Revision by Conjunction)  If X∗P ∪ {Q} is consistent, then X∗(P ∩ Q)) = (X∗P)+Q,
where for any X and P, X+P is the expansion of X with P, i.e., the set:
{Q ∈ P: ∩X ∩ P ⊆ Q}.
Sketch of proof:  Let W and P be given and let K be all subsets of P that are closed under en-
tailment.  We associate with every consistent X ∈ K a system $X of spheres in the sense of
Grove (1988) around ∩X.  If X and P are consistent, then we define X∗P to be {Q
∈ P: S ∩ P ⊆  Q}, where S is the smallest sphere in $X such that S ∩ P ≠ ∅.  Otherwise, we
let X∗P be ℘(W).  It is easily verified that the conditions Success, Consistency, Closure, (W),
and Revision by Conjunction are satisfied.  Preservation follows from (W) together with Re-
vision by Conjunction.  We can easily see to it that P contains two propositions P and Q such
that P ∩ Q ≠ ∅, P ∩ -Q ≠ ∅, -P ∩ Q ≠ ∅ and -P ∩ -Q ≠ ∅.  Two such propositions are said
to be completely independent.  Let then X = {R: P ⊆ R}, Y = {R: Q ⊆ R} and Z = {R: P ∩
Q ⊆ R}.  Then, X, Y, Z are consistent belief states such that:
(1) P ∈ X and X ∪ {-Q} is consistent;
(2) Q ∈ Y and Y ∪ {-P} is consistent;
(3) X ⊆ Z and Y ⊆ Ζ.
Thus, Non-Triviality is satisfied.
We are next going to define the operation ⇒X.  For this purpose, we associate with each
world w and each belief state X a system of spheres $X,w that is weakly centered around w.
We impose the following constraint:
if w ∈ ∩X, then $X,w = $X.
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That is, if w is a world that is compatible with all the beliefs in state X, then the sphere system
around w coincides with that around X.
We define ⇒X by letting:
P ⇒X Q = {w: (∃S ∈ $X,w)(∅ ≠ S ∩ P ⊆  Q)}.
It remains to show that P-Ramsey holds, i.e.,
P ⇒X Q ∈ X iff Q ∈ X∗P.
Suppose that P ⇒X Q ∈ X.  Then, ∩X ⊆  P ⇒X Q.  That is, (i) for all w ∈ ∩X, w ∈ (P ⇒X
Q).  If ∩X = ∅, then X∗P = ℘(W).  Hence, the desired conclusion holds in this case.  Sup-
pose that (ii) ∩X ≠ ∅.  By the constraint: for all w ∈ ∩X,
w ∈ (P ⇒X Q) iff (∃S ∈ $X)(∅ ≠ S ∩ P ⊆ Q).
But (i) and (ii) yields that for some w ∈ ∩X, w ∈ (P ⇒X Q).  Hence, (∃S ∈ $X)(∅ ≠ S ∩ P ⊆
Q).  But this means that Q ∈ X∗P.
For the other direction, suppose that Q ∈ X∗P.  Let w ∈ ∩X.  By the constraint,
w ∈ (P ⇒X Q) iff (∃S ∈ $X)(∅ ≠ S ∩ P ⊆ Q).
That is,
w ∈ (P ⇒X Q) iff Q ∈ X∗P.
It follows that w ∈ (P ⇒X Q).   We have shown that, ∩X ⊆ (P ⇒X Q), which means that
(P ⇒X Q) ∈ X. º
In the above proof we outlined a semantics for belief revision and conditionals based on
systems of spheres.  First, every belief state X was associated with a system of spheres $X in
terms of which the belief revision operation X∗... was defined.  Secondly, each world w was
associated with a system of spheres $X,w relative to X.  In terms of the latter system of
spheres, we could define the propositional operator (... ⇒X ...).  A condition was imposed
connecting the two kinds of sphere systems:
if w is compatible with all the beliefs in X, then $X,w = $X.
From this condition, we proved:
(P-Ramsey) P ⇒X Q ∈ X iff Q ∈ X∗P.
This modelling showed (P-Ramsey) to be compatible with propositional versions of
Gärdenfors' axioms for belief revision.
Suppose now that we have a formal language L with sentences built up from atomic ones
using Boolean connectives ⊥ and → and the conditional connective >.  L0 is the fragment of
L without >.  We let S = <W, P, K, ∗, ⇒X> be a belief revision system satisfying Success,
Consistency, Preservation Non-Triviality and P-Ramsey.  We let œ...“ be an interpretation
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function that assigns propositions œA“X to sentences A in L relative to belief states X.  This
function is assumed to satisfy the requirements:
(a) If A is a sentence of L0, then for all X, Y ∈ K, œA“X = œA“Y.  Hence, for sentences
of L0 we may write œA“ instead of œA“X.
(b) For every P ∈ P, there exists a sentence A of L0 such that P = œA“X.
(The Expressibility Assumption)
(c) œ⊥“X = ∅.
(d) œA → B“X = (W - œA“X) ∪ œB“X.
(e) œA > B“X = œA“X ⇒X œB“(X∗œA“X)
Writing X∗A for X∗œA“X, we can simplify (e) to:
œA > B“X = œA“X ⇒X œB“(X∗A).
Assumption (a) says that the sentences of the basic language L0 are context-independent.  The
expressibility assumption is the requirement that the basic language has sufficient expressive
power to express all the propositions that the agent might accept.  Together these two condi-
tions makes it possible to represent belief states, in a context-independent way, by sets of sen-
tences of L0.
We say that a sentence A is accepted in the belief state X just in case the proposition œA“X
that is expressed by A relative to X is accepted in X.  That is:
A is accepted in X iff œA“X ∈ X.
Then, we get:
A > B is accepted in X iff
 œA > B“X ∈ X iff
(œA“X ⇒X œB“(X∗A)) ∈ X iff
œB“(X∗A) ∈ X∗œA“X iff
œB“(X∗A) ∈ X∗A iff
B is accepted in X∗A.
That is, we get our original formulation of the Ramsey test:
(RT) A > B is accepted in the belief state X iff B is accepted in X∗A.
Gärdenfors' paradox arises when we do not distinguish clearly between sentences and the
propositions expressed by sentences and do not pay attention to the context dependent nature
of epistemic conditionals.  The principles of Success, Consistency, and Preservation, — for-
mulated as above for propositions and belief states — are consistent with the Ramsey test.
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4.  The Ramsey test and revision of belief sets
Our resolution of Gärdenfors' paradox depended on viewing belief revision as primarily an
operation on belief states and interpreting Gärdenfors' postulates on belief revision as apply-
ing to such an operation.  We showed that such a propositional belief revision system could
be provided with a context-dependent operator ⇒X on propositions satisfying (P-Ramsey).
Finally, we showed that the conditional connective > could be interpreted semantically in
terms of ⇒X in such a way that the Ramsey test (RT) became valid.
Now we want to see what happens if we view belief revision as an operation on belief sets,
i.e., sets of sentences, instead.  Starting out from a belief revision system S = <W, P, K, ∗,
⇒X> and an interpretation function œ...“ satisfying the conditions (a) - (e) above,we define
a corresponding logic L, a set ↑(K) of belief sets corresponding to the set K of all belief
states, and an operation ∗ of belief revision on belief sets.  As a matter of fact, we define two
notions of belief set, one for the basic language L0 and one for the extended language L, and
correspondingly two notions of belief revision.  Within our framework, the two notions are
interdefinable and the Ramsey test can be formulated in terms of both.
First, we define the logic L determined by S and œ...“.  We say that a sentence A in L is an
L-consequence of a set Γ of sentences in L (in symbols, Γ ªL A) if for every belief state X
∈ K, ∩{œB“X: B ∈ Γ} ⊆ œA“X.  That is, Γ ªL A iff for every belief state X and every
possible world w, if all the sentences in Γ are true at w relative to X, then A is also true at w
relative to X.  For sentences in L0 the reference in this definition to the belief state X becomes
superfluous.  That is, if Γ is a set of sentences in L0 and A belongs to L0, then: Γ ªL A iff
∩{œB“: B ∈ Γ} ⊆ œA“.
Next, we need to decide on what we shall understand by a belief set.  Each belief state is
associated with two sets of sentences: First we have the set:
{A ∈ L0: œA“ ∈ X}
of all non-indexical or basic sentences that corresponds to X.  Then there is the set of all sen-
tences of the extended language L that are accepted in X, i.e., the set:
{A ∈ L: œA“X ∈ X}.
Let us speak of the first set as the descriptive belief set corresponding to the belief state X,
and the second set as the acceptance set corresponding to X.  In view of the expressibility as-
sumption, there is a one-to-one correspondence between belief states and descriptive belief
sets.  We also have a one-to-one correspondence between descriptive belief sets and accep-
tance sets.  For each acceptance set G, the corresponding descriptive belief set is the set G ∩
L0 which we may refer to as the descriptive core of G, or core(G).  Conversely, for each de-
scriptive belief set K, we can define the corresponding acceptance set as:
E(K) = {A ∈ L: œA“œK“ ∈ œK“),
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where œK“ is the belief state that corresponds to K, i.e., œK“ = {œB“: B ∈ K}.  In other
words, E(K) is the set of all sentences of L that are accepted in the belief state corresponding
to K.  Of course, G = E(K) iff K = core(G).
For each belief state X, we let ↑(X) be the acceptance set corresponding to X, i.e.,
↑(X) = {A ∈ L: œA“X ∈ X}.
and we let ↑(K) be the set of all acceptance sets, i.e.,
↑(K) = {↑(X): X ∈ K}.
The sentences of core(G) are context-independent, so we can speak in a context-independent
way of the proposition œA“ expressed by A, for each A ∈ core(G).  Furthermore, we have
assumed that every proposition in K is expressed by some sentence in L0 (The Expressibility
Assumption).  It follows that we can recover the belief state corresponding to a acceptance set
G as the set of all propositions that are expressed by some member of core(G).  That is the
belief state corresponding to G is defined as:
œG“ = {œA“: A ∈ core(G)} = œcore(G)“.
Notice that::
œ↑(X)“ = X, and
↑(œG“) = {A ∈ L: œA“œG“ ∈ œG“} = {A ∈ L: A ∈ G} = G.
We also have:
if œG“ = œH“, then G = H.
In order to prove this, let œG“ = œH“.  Then, G = ↑(œG“) = ↑(œH“) = H.
We can now define two operations of belief revision, one operation ⊕ on descriptive belief
sets and the other ∗ on acceptance sets.  For any descriptive belief set K and any A ∈ L, we
let:
K⊕A = {B ∈ L0: œB“ ∈ œK“∗A} = {B ∈ L0: œB“ ∈ œK“∗œA“œK“}.
That is, if K is a descriptive belief set and A is a sentence of L, then we define K⊕A as fol-
lows: first, we go to the belief state œK“ corresponding to K.  We then revise that state with
the proposition œA“œK“ that A expresses relative to that state.  Finally, we let K⊕A be the
set of all sentences of L that are accepted in the resulting belief state.
Similarly, we define for any acceptance set G:
G∗A = ↑(œG“∗A) = {B ∈ L: œB“(œG“∗A) ∈ œG“∗A}.
We have:
œK⊕A“  = œK“∗A, and
œG∗A“ = œG“∗A.
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The two operations are interdefinable as follows:
G∗A = E(core(G)⊕A)
K⊕A = core(E(K)∗A).
For any pair of descriptive belief states K, K' we have:
K ⊆ K' iff œK“ ⊆  œK'“.
However, for acceptance sets G, H, we do not have:
G ⊆ H iff œG“ ⊆  œH“.
For acceptance sets G and H, it is important not to conflate ordinary set inclusion (G
⊆ Η) with the relation (we write it, G ˙ H) that holds iff all the propositions that are accepted
in the belief state œG“ are also accepted in œH“.  Due to the Expressibility Assumption, we
can define ˙ as follows:
G ˙ H iff core(G) ⊆ core (H).
We have, of course,
G ˙ H iff œG“ ⊆  œH“.
Let us now see how to formulate the Ramsey test and Preservation within the present
framework.  First, we consider the Ramsey test:
(RT) A > B is accepted in the belief state X iff B is accepted in X∗A.
In terms of acceptance sets and revision of acceptance sets, this becomes:
A > B ∈ G iff B ∈ G∗A.
The same condition formulated in terms of descriptive belief sets K and the operation ⊕ is:
A > B ∈ E(K) iff B ∈ E(K⊕A).
Consider next P-Preservation:
(P-Preservation) If Q is accepted in a given belief state X and P is consistent with 
X, then Q is still accepted in X∗P.
This corresponds to:
If A ∈ L0, K is a descriptive belief set and  K ∪ {A} ª/  L ⊥, then K ⊆ K⊕A,
(L0-Preservation)
In other words,
If A ∈ L0, G is an acceptance set and (core(G) ∪ {A}) ª/  L ⊥, then G ˙ G∗A.
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Suppose next that S = <W, P, K, ∗, ⇒X> satisfies P-Success, P-Consistency, P-Preservation,
Closure, (W), Revision by Conjunction, Non-Triviality and P-Ramsey and that œ...“ satisfies
the conditions (a) - (e) above.  Then, the following conditions are also satisfied:
(1) The logic L determined by S and œ...“ contains all substitution instances of truth-
functional tautologies and is closed under modus ponens (i.e.,  if ªL A and ªL A → B, then
ªL B).
(2) If ªL A ↔ Β and ªL C ↔ D, then ªL (A > C) ↔ (B > D) .
(3) Descriptive belief sets and acceptance sets are L-closed sets in L0 and L, respectively.
(Closure)
(4) E is a one-to-one mapping between descriptive belief sets and acceptance sets such
that for each descriptive belief set K, K = E(K) ∩ L0.
(5) If A ∈ L0, then A ∈ K⊕A. (L0-Success)
(6) If A ª/  L ⊥ and K ª/  L ⊥, then K⊕A ª/  L ⊥. (L0-Consistency)
(7) If A ∈ L0, K is a descriptive belief set and  K ∪ {A} ª/  L ⊥, then K ⊆ K⊕A,
(L0-Preservation)
(8) If A ∈ L0 and K ∪ {A} ª/  L ⊥, then K⊕A = K+A,
where K+A = {B ∈ L0: K ∪ {A} ªL B}. (L0-Expansion)
(9) If  ªL A ↔ B, then K⊕A = K⊕B.
(10) If A, B ∈ L0 and K⊕A ∪ {B} ª/  L ⊥, then K⊕(A ∧ B) = (K⊕A)+B.
(L0-Revision by Conjunction)
(11) A > B ∈ E(K) iff B ∈ E(K⊕A) (The Ramsey test)
(12) There  exist two sentences B and C in L0 and three consistent descriptive belief sets G,
H and K such that: (i) B ∈ G and G ∪ {¬C} is consistent; (ii) C ∈ H and H ∪ {¬B} is
consistent; and (iii) G ⊆ K and H ⊆ K (L0-Non-Triviality)
In virtue of Theorem 2, there are belief revision systems satisfying the above conditions.  It is
also easy to see that œ...“ can be defined (recursively) in such a way that conditions (a) - (e)
are satisfied.  It follows that conditions (1) - (12) are mutually consistent.
The present approach has the formal advantage over Levi's (1988) of being able to account for
iterated conditionals in a natural way.  Levi's version of the Ramsey test does not provide a
method for evaluating such conditionals.  The present version of the  test can, however, be
applied to iterated conditionals without difficulty.  Consider, for example, (A > B) > (C > D).
According to (RT), we have:
(A > B) > (C > D) ∈ E(K) iff C > D ∈ E(K⊕(A > B)) iff D ∈ E((K⊕(A > B))⊕C)).
Or, in other words,
(A > B) > (C > D) ∈ G iff C > D ∈ G∗(A > B) iff D ∈ (G∗(A > B))∗C)).
Semantically this means:
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œ(A > B) > (C > D)“X ∈ X iff œC > D“X∗(A > B) ∈ X∗(A > B) iff œD“(X∗(A > B))∗C
∈ (X∗(A > B))∗C,
where X is the belief state œG“.
5.  Can the paradox be reinstated?
It should be pointed out that the following form of Monotonicity:
For any descriptive belief sets K, K', and any A ∈ L0,
if K ⊆ K', then K⊕A ⊆ K'⊕A. (L0-Monotonicity)
is sufficient in the presence of L0-Success, L0-Consistency, L0-Preservation and L0-Non-
Triviality for the derivation of an inconsistency.  However, it is impossible to derive L0-
Monotonicity from
(RT) For every descriptive belief set K and any A, B ∈ L,
A > B ∈ E(K) iff B ∈ Ε(K⊕A).
Thus, Gärdenfors' paradox is avoided.
At this point the reader might object and point out that there is another form of Monotonicity
that actually follows from (RT), namely:
For any descriptive belief sets K, K', and any A ∈ L,
if E(K) ⊆ E(K'), then E(K⊕A) ⊆ Ε(K'⊕A). (L-Monotonicity)
Couldn't this condition be used to construct a version of Gärdenfors' paradox?  This seems in
fact possible.  The only thing we have to do is to replace the condition of L0-Non-Triviality
with the stronger condition:
(∗) There  exist two sentences B and C in L0 and three consistent descriptive belief sets G,
H and K such that: (i) B ∈ G and G ∪ {¬C} is consistent; (ii) C ∈ H and H ∪ {¬B} is
consistent; and (iii') E(G) ⊆ E(K) and E(H) ⊆ Ε(K).
It is easy to see that this condition is sufficient to derive a contradiction.  Let A be the sen-
tence ¬B ∨ ¬C.  Since, B and C belong to L0, the same holds for A.  It follows from (i) and
(ii) that each of G and H are logically compatible with A.  Since, B and C belong to G and H,
respectively, L0-Preservation implies that B ∈ G⊕A and C ∈ H⊕A.  Hence, B ∈ E(G⊕A)
and C ∈ E(H⊕A) (since, for any descriptive belief sets G, E(G) ∩ L0 = G).  However, since
E(G), E(H) ⊆ E(K) (condition (iii')), L-Monotonicity implies that E(G⊕A), E(H⊕A) ⊆
E(K⊕A).  It follows that B, C ∈ E(K⊕A).  By L0-Success, we also get A ∈ E(K⊕A).  But
this implies that K⊕A is inconsistent.  On the other hand, K⊕A must be consistent, by L0-
Consistency.
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It might seem as if we have indeed succeeded in reinstating the paradox.  However, this is not
really so.  The above proof is nothing but a reductio proof of the negation of (∗) from the
premises: L0-Success, L0-Consistency, L0-Preservation and (RT).  Given these assumptions,
the situation envisaged in (∗) is impossible.  This is no paradox, since we have no reasons to
believe (∗) to be true.
To illustrate the situation envisaged in L0-Non-Triviality, let B be the sentence "It is raining
in Uppsala" and C the sentence "It is snowing in Lund".  Suppose that our agent starts from a
belief state in which has no opinion about the weather in either Uppsala or Lund.   Let G, H
and K be the descriptive belief sets that he would reach upon learning, respectively, B, C and
B ∧ C.  It is reasonable to assume that such G, H and K are going to satisfy conditions (i), (ii)
and (iii).  Thus, L0-Non-Triviality looks like a reasonable requirement.
However, (∗) is far from reasonable.  Applying the reasoning above to our example, we get B
∈ E(G⊕A) and C ∈ E(H⊕A).  It follows, by the Ramsey test that A > B ∈ E(G) and A > C ∈
E(H).  On the other hand, we also have that A ∈ E(K⊕A) and that K⊕A is consistent.  Hence,
it follows that either B ∉ E(K⊕A) or C ∉ E(K⊕A).  Hence, by the Ramsey test again, either
A > B ∉ E(K) or A > C ∉ E(K).  Consequently, we cannot have both E(G) ⊆ E(K) and E(H)
⊆ Ε(K).  Even though G and H may both be included in K, some of the conditionals accepted
in G or H will have to disappear as we move to K.  The impression that (iii') could obtain
arises because we do not clearly distinguish between a (descriptive) belief set and the set of
sentences that are accepted in this belief set.
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 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Konstanz Colloquium in Logic and In-
formation, October 5 - 7, 1992.  I wish to thank the participants of the colloquium, especially
André Fuhrmann, Michael Morreau, Hans Rott and Krister Segerberg, for their very helpful
comments and remarks.  I also want to thank Bertil Strömberg for his comments on an earlier
draft.  My greatest debt is of course to Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz, my long-time collaborator
in this field.  I am grateful for his many stimulating suggestions and criticisms of earlier
drafts.
1
 The idea underlying the Ramsey test goes back to a suggestion that Frank Ramsey made in a
footnote in one of his posthumously published papers (See Ramsey, 1931, p. 248.).  The
modern version of the test, a generalization of Ramsey's original idea, is essentially due to
Robert Stalnaker (1968).  His formulation of the test is as follows: "This is how to evaluate a
conditional: First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; second, make
whatever adjustments are required to maintain consistency (without modifying the hypotheti-
cal belief in the antecedent); finally, consider whether or not the consequent is then true".
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2
 While the Ramsey test may appear plausible for indicative conditionals like (1), it does not
work so well for subjunctive ones.  A person who has good reasons to accepts (1), need not
have reasons to accept the corresponding subjunctive conditional: (2) If the butler hadn't done
it, then the gardener would have.  See Lindström & Rabinowicz (1992b), p. 2-3, for some
reflections on the distinction between indicative and subjunctive conditionals.  There we ar-
gue that the grammatical distinction between indicative and subjunctive conditionals is
closely linked to a semantic distinction: "On the one hand, we have the epistemic (or doxastic)
conditionals that express our dispositions to change our beliefs in the light of new infor-
mation.  These are the ones for which the Ramsey test appears plausible.  On the other hand,
there are the ontic ones that we use to make factual claims about the world.  The epistemic
conditionals have to do with hypothetical modifications of our beliefs about the world, while
the ontic conditionals represent the hypotheses concerning what would be the case if the
world itself were different — they have to do with the hypothetical modifications of the facts
rather than with the modifications of our beliefs about the facts.  This distinction between two
kinds of conditionals parallels the well-known distinction between two kinds of probabilities:
the epistemic probabilities ("credences") and the ontic or objective ones ("chances")."  In this
paper I am of course concerned with epistemic conditionals only.
3
 See also Gärdenfors (1986).  The discussion around the Ramsey test is complicated and in-
volves many different issues.  Among these are issues concerning the interpretation of condi-
tional sentences in natural language.  And also philosophical questions concerning the inter-
pretation of belief and the plausibility of the Ramsey test for various notions of belief.  And
finally there are the logical and philosophical issues that are actualised by Gärdenfors impos-
sibility theorem.  In this paper I am concentrating on the latter questions and I am deliberately
ignoring the broader issues concerning the interpretation of belief and the plausibility of the
test itself.  For a broader discussion of the Ramsey test that also involves these questions, see
Lindström & Rabinowicz (1992a) and (1992b).  The latter paper also reviews and compares
different approaches to Gärdenfors' paradox including the present one. I also recommend
Hansson's (1992) and Morreau's (1992) recent discussions of the Ramsey test to be read in
conjunction with the present one.
4
 
 Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, Makinson (1985).
5
  As will be seen from the discussion in Section 5, Non-Triviality is a far from innocuous
requirement.  At this point, however, we will not question it.
6
 The context-dependent nature of (indicative) conditionals, i.e., the idea that the same condi-
tional sentence may express different propositions relative to different epistemic states, has
been emphasised by Stalnaker (1975, 1984).  It is also utilized in Morreau's (1992) epistemic
semantics based on the Ramsey test for non-iterative conditionals.
7
 Cf. Quine (1962), p. 15.
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8
 Stalnaker (1975).  See Jackson (1991), p. 143.
References
Alchourrón, C. E., Gärdenfors, P., and Makinson, D. (1985) 'On the logic of theory change:
Partial meet contraction and revision functions', Journal of Symbolic Logic 50, 510-530.
Grove, A. (1988) ‘Two modellings for theory change’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 17,
157-170.
Gärdenfors, P. (1986) 'Belief Revision and The Ramsey Test for Conditionals', Philosophical
Review 96, 81-93.
Gärdenfors, P. (1988)  Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States, Brad-
ford Books, MIT Press.
Hansson, Sven Ove (1992) 'In Defence of the Ramsey Test', Journal of Philosophy. October
1992, 522-540.
Jackson, F. (ed.), (1991) Conditionals, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford.
Levi, I. (1988) 'Iteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Test', Synthese 76, 49-81.
Lewis, D. (1973) Counterfactuals, Basil Blackwell.
Lindström, S., and Rabinowicz, W. (1992a) 'Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals and the
Ramsey Test', Synthese 91: 195-237.
Lindström, S., and Rabinowicz, W. (1992b) 'The Ramsey Test Revisited',Theoria  58, ss. 131-
182. Utkommer dessutom i reviderad version i Crocco, Farinas del Serro, och Herzig (red.)
Conditionals from Philosophy to Computer Science, pp. 157-202, Oxford University Press,
1995.
Morreau, M. (1992) 'Epistemic Semantics for Counterfactuals', Journal of Philosophical
Logic 21: 33-62.
Quine, W. V. O, (1962) Methods of Logic, Second Edition Revised.  Routledge & Kegan
Paul.  London.
Ramsey, F. P. (1931) The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, edited by R.
B. Braithwaite, Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York.
Stalnaker, R. (1968) 'A Theory of Conditionals', Studies in Logical Theory, American Philo-
sophical Quarterly, Monograph: 2, 98-112.  Reprinted in Jackson (1991).
Stalnaker, R. (1975) 'Indicative Conditionals', Philosophia 5, 269-86.  Reprinted in Jackson
(1991).
Stalnaker, R. (1984) Inquiry.  The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
